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F45We investigate the drivers of interdependence between flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), focusing on
two potential channels: interdependence between geographically close FDI destination countries, and between
destination countries with similar levels of public debt. Using data on bilateral FDI flows between the 27 EU
member countries in 2007,wefind that in addition to geographic proximity, similarity in public debt levels drives
cross-country correlation in FDI inflows. The public debt threshold of 60% of GDP prescribed by the Maastricht
Treaty is a crucial driver of interdependence between FDI inflows. FDI inflows are correlated within the group
of compliant countries as well as within the group of non-compliers. This is consistent with the fact that foreign
investors distinguish between countries which violate this Maastricht criterion and those that do not.







Across-market spillovers or spatial interdependence in financial flows
such as foreign direct investment (FDI) have become a key concern for ac-
ademic scholars. This paper contributes to this literature by distinguishing
two channels for interdependence of bilateral FDI flows between
neighboring FDI destination countries. Previous studies have highlightedfor their useful comments.
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016), http://dx.doi.org/10.10geographic proximity as a channel that gives rise to interdependence of
investments across FDI host countries (e.g., Baltagi et al., 2007; Blonigen
et al., 2007): investments made by one source country in different host
countries which share a common border or which are geographically
close are correlated. This paper focuses on a new channel for interdepen-
dence of FDI: FDI flows are correlated across host countries with similar
levels of public debt.
During the recent financial crisis and subsequent public debt crisis in
the European Union (EU), many observers feared that an economic
downturn in one country could spill over to other countries. However,
the fear was not about “contagion” across geographically close countries
but across countries with similarly high debt levels.5 Accordingly, some
analysts, economists, and the press pejoratively referred to Portugal,5 There are numerous articles about this in the press. A typical example is an article in the
“Financial Times” on 04/29/2010with the title “Spanish debt downgrade by S&P sparks fresh
fears over contagion as euro suffers”which cites the then head of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, Angel Gurria, with the words “It's not a question of
the danger of contagion; contagion has already happened”. And further, “This is like Ebola.
When you realise you have it you have to cut your leg off in order to survive”.
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2 L. Alamá-Sabater et al. / Economic Modelling xxx (2016) xxx–xxxItaly, Greece, and Spain as the “PIGS” countries to highlight their similar
macroeconomic characteristics, such as their high levels of public debt.6
Fig. 1 depicts the ratio of central government debt to GDP in the EU in
2007. As can be seen, similarity in public debt levels does not strictly
follow geographic borders but defines a distinct dimension for potential
interdependence of investments between host countries.
This was one of the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty
which sparked the most intense debate in the media and policy arena:
a country has to have a public debt-to-GDP ratio of 60% or lower. In
fact, a higher level of debt is considered as a violation of the Maastricht
Treaty.
Our main hypothesis is that investors perceive the Maastricht
compliers and non-compliers as two separate groups of countries.
Under imperfect information, when an investor is deciding on the
amount of FDI in a particular country, shemay use not only information
about a country's business cycle (proxied by, for example, a country's
GDP) but also information from other, similar countries. We argue
that it may not be only between geographically close countries that
this learning across countries occurs. In addition, investors may use
the violation of the Maastricht criterion as an additional criterion to
group countries. Hence, information which leads to a change in FDI in
a country within, say, the group of Maastricht compliers may also influ-
ence FDI decisions in other countries in the same group. Accordingly,
the correlation between FDI flows should be higher within groups but
not between groups, i.e., it should be higher if both host countries violate
the Maastricht criterion. Similarly, if two host countries are below the
Maastricht threshold, they should exhibit a higher correlation of inbound
FDI flows. This is also in line with investors using Maastricht compliance
as a noisy signal of fiscal policy under imperfect information (see Fève
and Pietrunti, 2016). Imperfect information is particularly relevant for
FDI (see, e.g., Portes and Rey, 2005).
Let us explain by using a simple example. Consider an investor from
country A that already invests in three countries: B, C, and D. B shares
a common border with C but not with D. B and D both have public
debt-to-GDP ratios above 60% and thus are in violation of the of the
Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria, while C is below this level (see
Fig. 2). Now, imagine that there occurs a negative shock in country B
which leads the investor from A to reduce her investments in B. If
there are only geographic spillovers in FDI across destinations, this
will lead the investor to reduce her investments in the contiguous country
C but not inD. However, if the level of public debt is a relevant channel for
FDI spillovers, she will reduce her investments in D but not in C. If both
channels are important, she will reduce her investments in both C and D.
A similar story could be told with three investors from A who have
each only a single investment in B, C, and D, respectively, and who
learn from the behavior of each other. If one investor reduces her invest-
ment in B, thismay lead other investors to also reduce their investment in
C or D. This alternative story stresses the possibility of learning across
investors within a country. Both stories have identical implications for
aggregate FDI flows: FDI flows may be correlated across host countries
due to either the geography or the public debt channel we propose.7
We provide evidence consistent with the channel of similarity in
public debt levels, in addition to the geographic proximity channel.
We do so by using a spatial gravity model of European bilateral flows
of FDI in 2007, which allows us to gauge the relative importance of
the two separate channels by specifying two separate spatial weight
matrices. In addition, our paper introduces a simple and effectivemethod
to construct spatial weight matrices, so-called fuzzy metrics. Fuzzy6 For example, “The Sun”, a British tabloid newspaper, published a cartoon which
showed four pigs eating money dressed in the flags of the four countries, as reported by
http://www.englishblog.com/2010/02/cartoon-euro-pigs.html#.VzDBqPmLQm4.,
accessed 05/09/2016.
7 According to the “fire-sale FDI hypothesis”, negative shocks in a host country may ac-
tually increase FDI inflows, see Weitzel et al. (2014). Still, the question remains whether
there exists interdependence between FDI host countries, and via which channel this in-
terdependence operates.
Please cite this article as: Alamá-Sabater, L., et al., What drives interdepen
and similarity in public debt, Econ. Model. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.10metrics allow the researcher to model a concept of ‘neighborhood’
that takes several dimensions of space into account, generalizing
the uni-dimensional weight matrices typically used in the spatial
econometrics literature. They also allow us to construct a summary
measure of the two channels of potential interdependence between
host countries. Our proposed method is completely general and can
be applied to other areas which use spatial econometric methods.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews
the literature. Section 3 introduces our spatial econometric framework for
modeling the interdependence of bilateral FDI flows across host countries
due to both geographic proximity and similarity in public debt. Estimation
results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature review
The conventional framework for studying the determinants of
bilateral FDI flows has been the gravity equation, which takes into
account the fact that FDI depends on origin and destination factors as
well as on bilateral variables such as geographical distance between the
origin and the destination of flows, as is the case with gravity regressions
for bilateral trade flows. Distance is an impediment to trade due to trade
costs, which partly consist of transport costs for shipping physical goods.
Portes and Rey (2005) and Daude and Fratzscher (2008) argue that FDI
flows decrease with increasing distance due to higher informational
frictions. These frictions are a key concern for investors due tomonitoring
costs as well as uncertainty generated by an unknown business environ-
ment. Other examples for bilateral gravity models of FDI are de Ménil
(1999), Bergstrand and Egger (2007), Márquez-Ramos (2011), and
Blonigen and Piger (2014).
A second strand of the literature models the interdependence of FDI
between host countries using spatial econometrics. Examples are Baltagi
et al. (2007), Blonigen et al. (2007), Baltagi et al. (2008), Chou et al.
(2011), Blanco (2012), Leibrecht and Riedl (2014), and Alamá-Sabater
et al. (2016). In these studies, interdependence between FDI host coun-
tries arises due to geographic proximity. In econometric terms, simple
dichotomous measures of neighborhood (sharing a common border or
not) are used to construct the spatial lag. Also, continuous measures of
neighborhoodusing some function of the distance between two countries
have been employed. However, none of the studies consider the interde-
pendence between FDI due to similarity in public debt across host coun-
tries as we do.
To the best of our knowledge, only Claeys et al. (2012) use somewhat
similarmeasures tomodel the interdependence of interest rates between
countries. They use the capitalization of the bondmarket (both public and
private) as well as debt in terms of GDP to calculate spatial weights in
their spatial econometric approach. Their results highlight the interde-
pendence of interest rates between EU countries due to our proposed
channel of public debt similarity.
Our paper also relates to the literature on macroeconomic interde-
pendence, financial network effects, and contagion between countries,
e.g., Allen and Gale (2000), Dasgupta (2004), Leitner (2005), Elliott
et al. (2014), Acemoglu et al. (2015), and Babus (2016). This literature
predominantly focuses on cross-border holdings of assets and debt
between banks. Besides banks, mutual funds are also potential drivers
of interdependence via their portfolio investments (see Puy, 2016).
Financial services are an increasingly important part of FDI, as they
constituted roughly 50% of the total value of cross-border mergers and
acquisitions worldwide in 2007, up from about 20% in 2002, see Buch
and Lipponer (2007) and UNCTAD (2008).
It is worth mentioning that there is no broad consensus as to what
constitutes contagion. For a recent overview of the different definitions
used, see Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2016). For example, Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) define contagion as a sudden increase in the corre-
lation between stock market indices, whereas they refer to the mere
correlation acrossmarkets as interdependence. Our spatial econometric
approach does capture these cross-country correlations. We follow thedence of FDI among host countries? The role of geographic proximity
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Fig. 1. Central government debt as a share of GDP in 2007. This figure depicts the level of central government debt as a share of GDP in 2007 for the EU-27 countries. Blue countries have a
debt ratio below 60% of GDP (one of the Maastricht Treaty criteria), and red countries above that level. Data source: Eurostat. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
3L. Alamá-Sabater et al. / Economic Modelling xxx (2016) xxx–xxxdefinition by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and refer to the cross-country
correlation of FDI flows across host countries as interdependence.
The literature to date on interdependence across financial net-
works has not studied the potential for interdependence of FDI
across FDI host countries with similar levels of public debt. Therefore,
our paper can be seen as a first attempt to uncover another dimension
of financial network structures, arising via FDI interdependence.
3. Econometric modeling of FDI flows
3.1. Baseline gravity model
In a first step, we follow the literature and estimate the following
baseline model for FDI flows:
lnFDIij ¼ α0 þ α1 lnYi þ α2 lnY j þ α3 lnPi þ α4 lnP j þ α5 lnDISTijþ
þ α6CONTIGij þ α7COMLANGij þ α8COLONYij þ εij;
ð1Þ
where ln denotes the natural logarithm and FDIij denotes the value of
bilateral FDI flows from country i to j. Yi and Yj represent the economic
size of the origin and destination countries, which we measure by
their respective gross domestic product (GDP). Income is included in
standard gravity models that analyze the determinants of FDI to proxy
for the size of the economies: larger economies invest more and attract
more investments (see, for example, Coughlin and Segev, 2000). Pi and
Pj are the population of the origin and destination countries. Populations
are included to control for the known tendency for FDI tomove between
wealthymarkets and the associated parameter is expected to be negative
(see Blonigen et al., 2007).8 CONTIGij is a dummy that takes a value of 1
when countries share a border and 0 otherwise. COMLANGij is a dummy
for countries sharing a language that is spoken by at least 9% of the
population in both countries. COLONYij is a dummy that takes the
value of 1 if both countries have a shared colonial past, and 0 otherwise.
DISTij is calculated using bilateral distances between the largest cities of
countries i and j, with the intercity distances being weighted by the8 This argument only applies to horizontal FDI. If firms invest in countries to exploit
wage differences, one would expect the opposite sign, see Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007)
and Alamá-Sabater et al. (2016). Which of these two views prevails is an empirical
question.
Please cite this article as: Alamá-Sabater, L., et al., What drives interdepen
and similarity in public debt, Econ. Model. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.10share of the city population in the country's overall population. Distance
may have an ambiguous effect on FDI flows. As Portes and Rey (2005),
Daude and Fratzscher (2008), and Márquez-Ramos (2011) among
others all obtained a negative effect using a similar regression approach,
we also expect a negative sign for α5. Finally, εij is the error term.3.2. Spatial gravity approach
In the previous non-spatial regression specification, the flow of FDI
from country i to j is completely determined by variables pertaining to
countries i and j only. In other words, conventional regression models
assume that outcomes for different units of observations are indepen-
dent of each other. However, it is likely that investors exhibit some
form of spatial correlation in terms of their FDI investment decisions
across countries. This is especially true if there are unobserved common
factors which affect the level of FDI flows and which may exhibit a spa-
tial pattern. This is one of the key rationales for using spatial economet-
ric models, see LeSage and Pace (2009).9 Generally, spatial correlation
refers to the pair-wise correlation of observations of a random variable
between two observations which are close in space. If the data are
mapped out geographically, it might be assumed that outcomes at a
given location depend on outcomes in nearby locations but not those
further away.
This raises the question of how to measure the closeness of observa-
tions and how to quantify the importance of these spatial spillovers or
interdependence of FDI flows. In addition, the question arises as to
which dimension we use to define neighborhood: is neighborhood
related to geographic space, i.e., the geographic distance between
two different FDI host countries? Or are there other dimensions of
space? In our regressions, we will construct a measure of neighborhood
to determine whether there is interdependence of FDI flows between
high public debt FDI host countries (and between low public debt
host countries), while also controlling for the potential presence of
more conventional geographic spillovers.
All our spatial weights should capture the fact that investors from
one country will change their investment behavior not only in reaction9 For example, Haaland andWooton (2007) stress the importance of labor market reg-
ulations such as employment protectionmeasures for the FDI location decision.Measuring
labor market institutions in quantitative regression models is notoriously difficult. As our
measures of GDP are only a proxy for the investment conditions in the different markets,
the presence of spatially correlated omitted factors seems a reasonable assumption.
dence of FDI among host countries? The role of geographic proximity
16/j.econmod.2016.06.007
12 Note that variables that vary only at the exporter or importer level such as income or
population are perfectly collinear with exporter and importer fixed effects and are there-
fore controlled for by the fixed effects.
Fig. 2. Illustration of the different channels for interdependence between FDI host countries.
4 L. Alamá-Sabater et al. / Economic Modelling xxx (2016) xxx–xxxto changes in destination country j but also in j's neighbors, i.e., we specify
our spatial lag to capture the spillover effects in the destination of FDI
flows. For ease of exposition, let us focus on the simplest neighborhood
concept: sharing a common border. As explained by LeSage and Pace
(2008), we can capture these destination spillovers in the following
way: let C
C
denote a n×n contiguity matrix between the n countries in
our sample. Its typical entry cij is 1 if country i and j share a common
border, and 0 otherwise; the main diagonal is set to 0, as i cannot be its
own neighbor. CC is the row-normalized counterpart to C
C
which we
obtain by dividing each element in a particular row of C
C
by the sum of
its entries in the respective row. Our data set has (potentially) N=n2
observations, i.e., N flows of FDI between country i and j. Using an
origin-centric ordering of our data set,10 we can then construct an ampli-
fied spatial weight matrix WC with dimension N×N which defines a
network among the FDI source country and the neighbors of the FDI
host country, i.e., destination-based dependence as follows:
WC ¼ In ⊗ CC ; ð2Þ
where In is a n×n identity matrix and⊗ denotes the Kronecker product.
Our regressor of interest, the spatial lag vector WCy (dimension
N×1), contains ∑j=1N wijC lnFDIij, where wijC is the typical entry of WC
and y is the N×1 vector of the dependent variable. The spatial lag is
obtained by averaging FDI flows across host countries which share a
common border with the FDI host country. Its corresponding parameter
ρ1 measures the impact of spillover effects of FDI flows from the
investing country to all countries with a common border of the FDI
host country. Hence ρ1 is a summary statistic of the impact of FDI
flows into geographically close destination countries on the FDI flows
into a particular destination country j. ρ1N0 implies that higher inflows
in geographically close countries lead to an increase in FDI in a particular
host country, and lower inflows in geographically close countries lead to
a decrease in FDI in a particular destination j.
Besides the role of geographic spillovers or interdependence, wewant
to test for the existence of an additional channel for FDI interdependence
between FDI host countries which share similar levels of public debt.
Therefore, we allow for interdependence of FDI destination flows if two
destination countries have a level of public debt below 60% of GDP, or if
both of them have public debt above 60% of GDP, i.e., if both countries
are violating the public debt criterion of the Maastricht Treaty.11
We denote the “debt contiguity” matrix by C
D
, whose entries are either
0 (no debt contiguity) or 1 (debt contiguity). From Fig. 1, it can be seen
that debt similarity makes countries such as Portugal and Greece direct
neighbors, as they both have debt exceeding 60% of GDP, even though
they do not share a common border, the conventional geographic indica-
tor of neighborhood. Hence, our debt contiguitymatrix captures a distinct10 For details, see LeSage and Pace (2008).
11 By this definition, we ensure that every country has at least one neighbor. This allows
us to row-normalize the weight matrix by the sum of all entries.
Please cite this article as: Alamá-Sabater, L., et al., What drives interdepen
and similarity in public debt, Econ. Model. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.10dimension of neighborhood. The augmented spatial weightmatrixwhich
identifies neighboring FDI destination countries is denoted by WD and is
obtained by the equivalent of Eq. (2), i.e.WD=In ⊗ CD, where CD is the
row-normalized counterpart of C
D
.
Adding both spatial lags to Eq. (1) leads to our main specification:
lnFDIij ¼ α0 þ α1 lnYi þ α2 lnY j þ α3 lnPi þ α4 lnP j þ α5 lnDISTijþ




wCij lnFDIij þ ρ2∑
N
j¼1
wDij lnFDIij þ εij:
ð3Þ
Hence, further to the baseline bilateral gravity model of FDI as given
in Eq. (1), we add not only a spatial lag of FDI flows into countries which
share a common border with a destination country, as is standard in the
literature using spatial gravity models of FDI, but, crucially, we also add
the spatial lag of FDI flows into countries which have similar public debt
levels (above/below theMaastricht criterion). This allows us to examine
the new channel we propose for FDI interdependence.
Spatial lags introduce an endogeneity problem when estimating
Eq. (3) by using OLS, see Anselin (1988) for the simplest case and
LeSage and Pace (2009) for a more general treatment. We follow
Anselin (1988) and use the instrumental variable (IV) estimator to get
consistent parameter estimates. As instruments for the spatial lags for
our data for 2007, we use the respective spatial lag of the time-lagged
values of the dependent variable, i.e., ∑jN wijC lnFDIij ,2004 and
∑jN wijD lnFDIij ,2004. To perform overidentification tests, we construct
another instrumental variable using a method inspired by Márquez-
Ramos (2011).We run the following first-stage gravity regression of bi-
lateral imports of country i from country j in 2004:
lnMij ¼ β1 lnDISTij þ β2 lnCONTIGij þ β3COMLANGij þ
þβ4COLONYij þ μ i þ ν j þ uij;
ð4Þ
where DISTij, CONTIGij, COMLANGij, and COLONYij are defined as above.
We also include importer and exporter dummies, μi and νj, to control
for the multilateral resistance terms which appear in trade gravity
equations as suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).12 In
a second step, the predicted logarithm of imports for year 2004 is
calculated (dlnMij;2004) and, finally, this prediction is used as an additional
excluded instrument for the endogenous spatial lags appearing in
Eq. (3).1313 Note that to get a valid instrument, we do not necessarily need consistent estimates of
the parameters of Eq. (4) as long aswe receive an instrument which is correlatedwith our
endogenous regressors but not correlated with the error term of Eq. (3). For a similar ar-
gument, see Felbermayr et al. (2010) and Heid and Larch (2012).
dence of FDI among host countries? The role of geographic proximity
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5L. Alamá-Sabater et al. / Economic Modelling xxx (2016) xxx–xxxWhy is it that we can use the predicted value of imports of country i
from country j in 2004 as an excluded instrument for the spatial lag of
FDI in 2007? For a good instrument, we have to fulfill two conditions:
relevance and exogeneity. As both imports and FDI flows are determined
by exogenous geographic factors like distance between countries, both
variables are correlated and are clearly relevant. Concerning exogeneity,
our argument goes as follows: when investors decide on where to invest,
they will focus on destination country characteristics such as the market
potential in a destination country, especially in the case of horizontal
FDI. Exports from i to j are also determined by the same factors, hence
they would be endogenous. The imports of country i from j, however,
are determined by consumer demand in the importer i, and hence are
independent of unobserved factors which determine FDI inflows into
destination countries.14 An argument against this reasoning would be
that vertical FDI predominates in FDI flows, as it depends on FDI source
country characteristics in the sense that goods produced by foreign affili-
ates in the FDI destination countries are shipped back to the FDI origin
country. However, vertical FDI crucially depends on wage differences
due to, for example, differences in factor endowments. As we focus on
FDI within the EU-27, where factor endowments are relatively similar,
horizontal FDI is empirically more relevant, and our exclusion restriction
is likely to hold. It is also in line with evidence presented by Kleinert and
Toubal (2010)whofind thatmodels of horizontal FDI aremore consistent
with foreign affiliate sales data (and hence FDI). In the same vein, Bajo-
Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1994) find that unit labor costs do not have a
significant impact on the level of manufacturing FDI inflows in Spain.
3.3. Data
We use data on bilateral FDI flows in 2007 between the EU-27
members as well as the public debt-to-GDP ratio from Eurostat.
Due to the log-linear specification, we only use positive FDI flows,
which leaves uswith 398 observations. FDI data comprise all investments
by adirect investor in a destination country if the investment is equivalent
to at least 10% of the voting power in thefirm's decision-making body. FDI
can take three different forms: investment in equity capital, reinvested
earnings as well as other FDI capital such as loans.15 As an instrument
for the endogenous spatial lag, we use the spatial lag using FDI data of
2004. For our first-stage regression for the construction of the additional
instrument of predicted trade flows, we use data on bilateral imports of
goods in 2004, also obtained from Eurostat.
Contiguity, common language, colonial relationship as well as dis-
tance are taken from the Centre d'études prospectives et d'informations
internationales (CEPII). Income and population data are from theWorld
Development Indicators (WDI).
4. What drives FDI interdependence?
4.1. Dichotomous neighborhood criteria: geographic proximity versus
Maastricht compliance
We present estimates of Eq. (3) in Table 1. We use the dichotomous
neighborhood criteria defined in the previous section, i.e., we consider
the interdependence of FDI flows between FDI host countries who
share a common border (geographic proximity) and between FDI host
countries which are either both Maastricht compliers or both Maastricht
non-compliers (Maastricht compliance). We present the OLS coefficient14 For this to be strictly true, supply of goods has to be exogenous.While this is problem-
atic in the long-run, capacity constraints, which are especially important in the short-run,
can alleviate this problem.
15 In the construction of the spatial lags, we replacemissing values of FDIflowswith zero.
Hence,we effectively assume that countrieswithmissingdata donot have a spatial impact
on other countries. Note, however, that we only do this in the construction of the spatial
weights but do not replace missing values in the dependent variable. We believe that this
is a good compromise between the need to set a specific spatial weight for every country
pair and imputation of values we do not observe.
Please cite this article as: Alamá-Sabater, L., et al., What drives interdepen
and similarity in public debt, Econ. Model. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.10estimates of our baseline FDI regression, Eq. (1), in column (1). We find
a positive and significant effect of the GDPs of the origin and host coun-
tries on FDI flows among the EU-27members. We find that a 1% increase
in the GDP of the FDI country of origin increases FDI flows by 2.2%. Inter-
estingly, market size in the FDI host country also has a positive effect on
FDI, but this effect is considerably lower: 0.6%. Contiguity between coun-
tries and sharing a common language also increase bilateral FDI flows,
whereas distancehas a negative impact, in linewith the argument that in-
formation frictions increase as distance increases, as argued by Portes and
Rey (2005). As we control for GDP, it is not surprising that an increase in
the population of both the origin and destination country lead to lower
FDI flows, as an increase in population with a constant GDP translates
into lower GDP per capita and hence a less attractive market. This may
also be interpreted as evidence more in line with horizontal than vertical
FDI motives if we interpret host country GDP per capita as a proxy for its
wage level.
In Columns (2) to (6) we report the results of estimating the spatial
gravity model for FDI given by Eq. (3) by IV.16 Column (2) includes the
spatial lag where we allow for interdependence of FDI flows across host
countries if both FDI host countries share a common border. Qualitatively,
the spatial model validates the results obtained using the baseline model
(i.e., column 1). However, coefficients are mostly smaller in absolute
magnitudes than in the non-spatial model. Distance in particular has a
lower impact on FDI flows when the spatial lag is included. The impact
of country-of-origin GDP is reduced to 1.4%. This illustrates the potential
bias of non-spatialmodels, especially given the fact thatwefind a positive
and significant effect of the spatial lag: the higher the investments
received by an EU country, the higher the investments received by
adjacent FDI destination countries. Similarly, a sudden fall in FDI in one
country is correlated with a reduction in FDI in contiguous countries.
This highlights the interdependence of FDI flows within Europe and
confirms previous findings in the literature, e.g., Blonigen et al. (2007),
Leibrecht and Riedl (2014) and Alamá-Sabater et al. (2016). It is also an
indication of the public goodnature of FDI in the EuropeanUnion: policies
which attract FDI to a particular EU member country lead to a positive
spillover in adjacent countries. This potentially creates a free-rider
problem if countries can benefit from a policy change in their neighbors
that improves their investment climate, attracting more FDI. It also im-
plies that a sudden fall in the attractiveness of an FDI host country will
not only reduce FDI in that particular country but also in its neighbors.
In column (3) we drop the spatial lag based on a common border
between FDI host countries. Instead, we now allow for interdependence
of FDI flows between host countrieswhich are either both above or both
below the Maastricht debt criterion of 60% of GDP.
We also find a positive and significant effect for the public debt
channel. The estimated coefficient is even larger than the coefficient
for interdependence across FDI host countries with a common border,
whichwe interpret as evidence of larger interdependence of FDI inflows
due to the public debt channel than due to the geographic proximity
channel. Hence, FDI flows into a particular country are correlated with
FDI flows into countries who are on the same page in terms of whether
or not they comply with the Maastricht criterion. The remaining coeffi-
cients are similar inmagnitude; however, contiguity loses its significance.
To rule out the possibility that our debt contiguity measure picks up
the interdependence of FDI flows between host countries which share a
common border, we simultaneously include both spatial lags in column
(4). Our control variables remain similar in magnitude but contiguity16 Table A.1 in the Appendix shows the results from the first stage that creates the addi-
tional instrument: contiguity and colonial links have a positive impact on trade, whereas
distance has a negative impact on imports, as expected according to the literature on trade
flows. Common language is not significant. Note that as we include predicted imports in
2004 as an instrument in addition to the spatial lags in 2004, we can perform Hansen's
overidentification test (OIT). We report the p-values of the corresponding J statistics at
the bottom of Tables 1 and 2. All our specifications pass the OIT; the endogeneity test re-
jects the exogeneity of the spatial lags, vindicating our use of IV. Hence, our models pass
standard specification tests.
dence of FDI among host countries? The role of geographic proximity
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18 Hencewe create a n×nmatrixC
C
whose typical entry is 1 if the capitals of countries i
Table 1
Spatial gravity of FDI flows in 2007: dichotomous neighborhood criteria.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnFDIij lnFDIij lnFDIij lnFDIij lnFDIij lnFDIij
CONSTANT 6.444⁎⁎⁎ 4.278⁎⁎ 4.740⁎⁎ 3.850⁎ 3.682⁎ 3.690⁎
(2.069) (2.156) (2.016) (2.030) (2.018) (1.992)
lnYi 2.175⁎⁎⁎ 1.416⁎⁎⁎ 1.085⁎⁎⁎ 0.925⁎⁎⁎ 1.097⁎⁎⁎ 0.905⁎⁎⁎
(0.128) (0.199) (0.217) (0.234) (0.213) (0.225)
lnYj 0.627⁎⁎⁎ 0.516⁎⁎⁎ 0.702⁎⁎⁎ 0.606⁎⁎⁎ 0.558⁎⁎⁎ 0.613⁎⁎⁎
(0.138) (0.138) (0.139) (0.136) (0.129) (0.133)
lnPi −1.549⁎⁎⁎ −1.050⁎⁎⁎ −0.781⁎⁎⁎ −0.692⁎⁎⁎ −0.822⁎⁎⁎ −0.677⁎⁎⁎
(0.141) (0.177) (0.184) (0.194) (0.172) (0.184)
lnPj −0.341⁎⁎ −0.362⁎⁎ −0.372⁎⁎ −0.377⁎⁎ −0.266⁎ −0.302⁎
(0.162) (0.162) (0.163) (0.159) (0.152) (0.156)
lnDISTij −0.867⁎⁎⁎ −0.346⁎ −0.793⁎⁎⁎ −0.475⁎⁎ −0.563⁎⁎⁎ −0.617⁎⁎⁎
(0.170) (0.194) (0.159) (0.185) (0.162) (0.160)
CONTIGij 0.635⁎⁎ 1.401⁎⁎⁎ 0.467 1.020⁎⁎⁎ 0.728⁎⁎ 0.624⁎⁎
(0.314) (0.356) (0.302) (0.354) (0.316) (0.308)
COMLANGij 1.035⁎⁎⁎ 1.049⁎⁎⁎ 1.445⁎⁎⁎ 1.328⁎⁎⁎ 0.941⁎⁎⁎ 1.157⁎⁎⁎
(0.295) (0.376) (0.351) (0.374) (0.349) (0.365)
COLONYij 0.433 0.922 0.713 0.946⁎ 0.843 0.854⁎
(0.429) (0.561) (0.450) (0.516) (0.531) (0.509)
Channels of FDI interdependence: spatial lag based on neighborhood defined by…
…common border 0.468⁎⁎⁎ 0.306⁎⁎⁎
(0.089) (0.097)
…Maastricht complier/non-complier 0.625⁎⁎⁎ 0.432⁎⁎⁎ 0.288⁎⁎
(0.097) (0.120) (0.135)
…within 1000 km 0.590⁎⁎⁎ 0.421⁎⁎⁎
(0.096) (0.125)
N 398 398 398 398 398 398
R2 0.525 0.471 0.530 0.513 0.525 0.538
ln L −809.3 −830.9 −807.3 −814.4 −809.3 −803.9
OIT J statistic (p-value) 0.353 0.802 0.772 0.829 0.997
Endog. test χ2 (p-value) 1.43e−05 8.50e−06 4.43e−06 8.09e−05 2.54e−05
Notes: Column (1) reports OLS coefficient estimates of Eq. (1); columns (2) to (6) report coefficient estimates for the instrumental variable regression given in Eq. (3) for the 27 European
Union countries in 2007. “common border” refers to the spatial lag constructed usingWC. “Maastricht complier/non-complier” refers to the spatial lag constructed usingWD. “within 1000 km”
refers to the spatial lag constructed usingWC⁎. For the construction of thesematrices, see themain text. As instruments for the endogenous spatial lags, we use the respective time-lagged spatial
lags using lnFDIij from 2004 as well as predicted log imports, dlnMij , in 2004 from the first-stage regression presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
6 L. Alamá-Sabater et al. / Economic Modelling xxx (2016) xxx–xxxregains its significance. Most importantly, we find a positive and signifi-
cant impact of both spatial lags. Hence, FDI flows into a particular country
are correlated with FDI flows into contiguous countries as well as into
countries with the same status as a Maastricht (non-)complier. The debt
channel for FDI interdependence also remains the more important
channel, even after controlling for the geography channel. Therefore, a
sudden change in FDI inflows into a country leads to similar changes in
destination countries with a similar Maastricht status. This highlights a
novel channel for potential spillovers of fiscal policy across countries:
lower investments in a country which does not comply with the 60%
threshold of public debt in terms of GDP are correlatedwith lower invest-
ments in other countries that are also non-compliant in terms of the debt
criterion. In that sense, our aggregate FDI regressions are consistent
with the notion that investors perceive two distinct groups of countries:
Maastricht compliers and non-compliers.
Until now, we have defined geographic proximity as sharing a
common border. Hence Malta and Cyprus do not have any neighbors.17
It is conceivable that there is interdependence between FDI flows into
Cyprus and Greece, or between those into Malta and Italy, simply due
to their geographic closeness. If this is true, this correlation is picked
up by the spatial lag using the public debt criterion, at least for Malta
and Italy, as both are above the Maastricht criterion. To check that our
results are not driven by this possibility, we construct another spatial
lag to measure the interdependence between geographically close17 We have set the row-standardized weights for these countries to 0.
Please cite this article as: Alamá-Sabater, L., et al., What drives interdepen
and similarity in public debt, Econ. Model. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.10host countries by defining neighbors as all host countries with capital
cities within a range of 1000 km.18 We present the estimates for this
spatial lag in column (5). When comparing with column (2), we find
broadly similar results, irrespective of the specific measure of geographic
proximity chosen. In column (6), we include both measures, the new
geographic proximity spatial lag aswell as theMaastricht criterion spatial
lag. The estimates for our control variables are similar to column (4).
However, we now find that geographic interdependence between FDI
host countries is larger than the interdependence via the public debt
channel.We stillfind that FDIflows are correlated betweenhost countries
with a similar Maastricht status, even when controlling for geographic
interdependence. Our results show that the two channels reflect distinct
dimensions of FDI interdependence, corroborating our reading of Fig. 1.
This is also consistent with the findings of Claeys et al. (2012). They
find that similarity in the level of bondmarket capitalization (measured
as the share of GDP) leads to interdependence between interest rates
across EU countries. As their bond market measure also includes public
debt, their channel for potential interactions is similar to ourmeasure of
public debt similarity. Foreign investors take into account the level of
interest rates, so an interdependence of interest rates in line with
the similarity of public debt naturally translates to a correspondingand j are within 1000 km, and 0 otherwise, and where we set the main diagonal to 0. We
can then create CC⁎, its row-normalized counterpart. The spatial lag is then constructed
using WC⁎=In⊗CC⁎.
dence of FDI among host countries? The role of geographic proximity
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Table 2
Spatial gravity of FDI flows in 2007: continuous neighborhood criteria.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnFDIij lnFDIij lnFDIij lnFDIij lnFDIij lnFDIij
CONSTANT 6.444⁎⁎⁎ 4.661⁎⁎ 4.738⁎⁎ 4.641⁎⁎ 4.757⁎⁎ 3.685⁎
(2.069) (1.977) (2.005) (1.995) (1.984) (1.984)
lnYi 2.175⁎⁎⁎ 0.914⁎⁎⁎ 0.987⁎⁎⁎ 0.923⁎⁎⁎ 0.958⁎⁎⁎ 0.896⁎⁎⁎
(0.128) (0.224) (0.231) (0.231) (0.228) (0.231)
lnYj 0.627⁎⁎⁎ 0.674⁎⁎⁎ 0.691⁎⁎⁎ 0.675⁎⁎⁎ 0.647⁎⁎⁎ 0.600⁎⁎⁎
(0.138) (0.135) (0.138) (0.137) (0.134) (0.133)
lnPi −1.549⁎⁎⁎ −0.668⁎⁎⁎ −0.688⁎⁎⁎ −0.651⁎⁎⁎ −0.737⁎⁎⁎ −0.663⁎⁎⁎
(0.141) (0.184) (0.194) (0.193) (0.196) (0.191)
lnPj −0.341⁎⁎ −0.345⁎⁎ −0.372⁎⁎ −0.362⁎⁎ −0.311⁎⁎ −0.296⁎
(0.162) (0.158) (0.163) (0.162) (0.157) (0.156)
lnDISTij −0.867⁎⁎⁎ −0.796⁎⁎⁎ −0.833⁎⁎⁎ −0.806⁎⁎⁎ −0.757⁎⁎⁎ −0.623⁎⁎⁎
(0.170) (0.154) (0.156) (0.155) (0.154) (0.160)
CONTIGij 0.635⁎⁎ 0.527⁎ 0.486⁎ 0.491⁎ 0.590⁎⁎ 0.648⁎⁎
(0.314) (0.294) (0.294) (0.294) (0.301) (0.306)
COMLANGij 1.035⁎⁎⁎ 1.274⁎⁎⁎ 1.337⁎⁎⁎ 1.346⁎⁎⁎ 1.171⁎⁎⁎ 1.080⁎⁎⁎
(0.295) (0.353) (0.357) (0.356) (0.355) (0.365)
COLONYij 0.433 0.686 0.678 0.710 0.670 0.839⁎
(0.429) (0.436) (0.437) (0.441) (0.439) (0.506)
Channels of FDI interdependence: spatial lag based on neighborhood defined by…
…inverse distance 0.715⁎⁎⁎ 1.537⁎⁎
(0.106) (0.604)
…debt similarity 0.673⁎⁎⁎ −0.845 0.261
(0.109) (0.618) (0.165)
…inv. distance & debt sim. 0.706⁎⁎⁎
(0.109)
…within 1000 km 0.448⁎⁎⁎
(0.137)
N 398 398 398 398 398 398
R2 0.525 0.554 0.541 0.547 0.561 0.540
ln L −809.3 −796.7 −802.6 −799.9 −793.6 −803.0
OIT J statistic (p-value) 0.974 0.991 0.958 0.812 0.955
Endog. test χ2 (p-value) 0.000596 0.000130 0.000304 0.00486 0.000116
Notes: Column (1) reports OLS coefficient estimates of Eq. (1); columns (2) to (6) report coefficient estimates for the instrumental variable regression given in Eq. (3) for the 27 European
Union countries in 2007. “inverse distance” refers to the spatial lag constructed using WFD. “debt similarity” refers to the spatial lag constructed using WR(i,j). “inv. distance & debt sim.”
refers to the spatial lag constructed usingWF. “within 1000 km” refers to the spatial lag constructed usingWC⁎. For the construction of these matrices, see the main text and Appendix A. As
instruments for the endogenous spatial lags, we use the respective time-lagged spatial lags using lnFDIij from2004 aswell as predicted log imports, dlnMij, in 2004 from thefirst-stage regression
presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
7L. Alamá-Sabater et al. / Economic Modelling xxx (2016) xxx–xxxinterdependence of FDI flows. In that sense, our results can be
interpreted as a kind of mirror image of Claeys et al. (2012).
4.2. Continuous neighborhood criteria: inverse distance versus public debt
similarity
Until now, we have used an “all or nothing” criterion for debt
contiguity to model FDI interdependence. However, it is an empirical
question whether interdependencies really only occur if both host
countries have violated the Maastricht criterion or not, or whether
the interdependence occurs more generally between host countries
with similar levels of public debt. For example, consider the case of
Germany versus the United Kingdom: in 2007, the UK had a level of
public debt of 43.5% of GDP, whereas Germany had 63.5%. According
to our debt contiguity measure from the previous section, these two
host countries would not be considered neighbors. However, it seems
possible that FDI interdependence will more likely occur between
Germany and the UK than between Germany and, say, Greece, a country
which also violates the Maastricht criterion but whose level of public
debt is 103.1% of GDP. In otherwords, it seems plausible to use ameasure
of similarity of public debt that allows for a continuous metric of neigh-
borhood. Similarly, FDI flows into countries may be more correlated, the
closer they are. Instead of defining neighborhood in a dichotomous way
aswe did in the previous section, one could also use a continuousweight
which decreases with increasing distance.Please cite this article as: Alamá-Sabater, L., et al., What drives interdepen
and similarity in public debt, Econ. Model. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.10Therefore, we introduce a new method for modeling continuous
neighborhood measures, so-called “fuzzy metrics”, to specify spatial
weight matrices. This allows us to model FDI interdependence in a
continuous fashion. In addition, fuzzy metrics allow us to combine
several neighborhood dimensions into one spatial weight matrix.
Thus we can investigate, for example, the combined effect of geo-
graphic proximity and public debt similarity using one summary
measure to construct the weights in our spatial weight matrix.
Fuzzy metric spaces have been investigated from different points of
view. We use the concept of a fuzzy metric space by George and
Veeramani (1994). To the best of our knowledge, fuzzy metrics have
not been used to create spatial weight matrices for spatial econometric
models before. However, there are antecedents in the literature which
are similar to our approach. For example, Bodson and Peeters (1975),
as cited in Anselin (1988), measure the accessibility of a particular
region by several modes of transportation using a weighted average of
(scaled) inverse distances for the different travel modes, an approach
which is somewhat similar in spirit to ours.
We will use two fuzzy metrics: a continuous measure of geographic
proximity related to the inverse distance between FDI host countries i
and j, Md(i, j), and a continuous measure of the similarity of the level
of public debt between FDI host countries i and j, R(i, j). We use these
measures to construct row-normalized spatial weight matrices, in the
same way as we used the dichotomous contiguity matrix and the
Maastricht complier/non-complier matrix in Section 3.2. Interesteddence of FDI among host countries? The role of geographic proximity
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it suffices to say that the spatial weights usingMd(i, j) decrease with in-
creasing distance between FDI host countries, and also decreasewith an
increasing difference between the public debt-to-GDP ratios of FDI host
countries when using R(i, j). The latter allows us to see whether the in-
terdependence between FDI flows into host countries is really related to
the fact that both host countries have the same status as either Maas-
tricht complier or non-complier, as we have seen in Section 4.1, or
whether the interdependence is higher when the respective levels of
public debt of the FDI host countries are more similar.
We present results using these weight matrices in Table 2. For
convenience, column (1) reproduces the baseline regression results
from Table 1. Column (2) uses the fuzzy measure of inverse distance
to gauge the interdependence between geographically close FDI host
countries. Results are very similar to column (2) from Table 1. Again,
we find that the impact of origin country GDP decreases, and in this
case even further, to about half of the estimate from the non-spatial
model. We find evidence of interdependence between FDI flows into
geographically close host countries also when using the fuzzy inverse
distance measure. Column (3) swaps the spatial lag using geographic
proximity with the spatial lag measuring similarity in the public debt
level. Again, similar to Table 1, we find that FDI flows are correlated
between host countries with similar public debt levels.
In column (4), we use a spatial weight matrix which uses the product
of Md(i, j) and R(i, j), Cij, to construct the spatial weights. This summary
measure allows for the interdependence of FDI flows between host coun-
trieswhich are either geographically close or share a similar level of public
debt. Results for our control variables are very similar to columns (2) and
(3). Our estimate of the interdependence between FDI host countries lies
between the estimate of columns (2) and (3), consistentwith the fact that
we use the product of both dimensions to create the singleweightmatrix.
Column (5) simultaneously includes both spatial lags from columns
(2) and (3). Interestingly, we nowfind that FDI flows into host countries
are significant and positively correlated only between geographically
close FDI host countries. Similar debt-to-GDP ratios in FDI host
countries, however, do not lead to FDI interdependence between
destinations.19 It seems as if theMaastricht criterion really does provide
a signal to investorswhich informs their investment decisions, irrespec-
tive of whether countries only just miss themark or far exceed the debt
criterion.
To checkwhether the continuousmeasure for geographic proximity
is responsible for the loss of significance of the debt similarity measure,
in column (6) we include the spatial lag which uses the dichotomous
geographic proximity variable (distance between capitals of FDI host
countries is b1000 km) instead of the fuzzy inverse distance measure.
Again, we do not find evidence for interdependence of FDI flows into
host countries with similar levels of public debt when controlling for
the channel of interdependence due to geographic proximity.
In sum,wefind that FDIflows into host countries are interdependent
among the EU-27 countries.We find evidence for both interdependence
due to geographic proximity as well as due to similarity of public debt
levels between FDI destination countries. However, it seems that the
latter type of spillover only operates between host country pairs
above or below the Maastricht criterion; if we focus only on similarity
in debt-to-GDP ratios, we do not find evidence for FDI interdependence
when also controlling for potential geographic FDI spillovers in host
countries.
It seems that the Maastricht criterion does inform investors' FDI
location decisions and they categorize countries as either “Maastricht
compliers” or “non-compliers”, whereas the underlying actual level of19 Again, specification tests do not reject the validity of our estimated models. Instru-
ments pass the overidentification test for exogeneity and the endogeneity test reports that
the spatial lags are endogenous. Also note that the stationarity restriction for amodel with
twoweightingmatrices is that the sum of the spatial lag coefficients lies in [−1;1], see Le-
Sage and Pace (2009), p. 221. Our estimates in both Tables 1 and 2 fulfill this condition.
Please cite this article as: Alamá-Sabater, L., et al., What drives interdepen
and similarity in public debt, Econ. Model. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.10public debt to GDP is ignored. This may be interpreted as evidence for
the importance of more or less arbitrary thresholds and policy goals as
they may give investors an easily observed signal of macro-prudential
policies. This highlights the importance of institutional determinants
such as the (perceived) sustainability of public finances for the stability
of FDI flows, in addition to general economic, geographic and cultural
factors like GDP, distance and common language. This also corroborates
findings by Portes and Rey (2005) who stress informational frictions as
important determinants of FDI flows.
5. Conclusions
This paper analyzes the potential correlation or interdependence of
FDI flows between the EU-27 countries in 2007. Specifically, we consider
FDI interdependence across geographically close FDI host countries and
those host countries with similar public debt characteristics, namely
similar levels of public debt or whether two host countries have a public
debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 60% and thus violate the Maastricht criteri-
on, or not. Using a spatial gravity equation of bilateral FDI flows, we find
that both these channels matter for FDI interdependence, in addition to
traditional determinants of FDI like market size and distance.
Interestingly, the Maastricht Treaty threshold of a maximum of 60%
of public debt over GDP is important for the interdependence of FDI
flows: if both FDI host countries violate the Maastricht criterion, the
correlation between FDI flows is significantly higher. It is also higher if
both countries do not violate the criterion. On the contrary, when
modeling interdependence as occurring between host countries with
similar levels of public debt (i.e., without explicitly considering the
threshold level of public debt established in the Maastricht Treaty),
we do not find evidence of FDI interdependence once the channel of
geographic proximity is taken into account. It would appear that a
violation of the Maastricht debt criterion is an important determinant
of FDI interdependence as it provides a simple and easily observable
signal to investors. Investors perceive countries that violate the
Maastricht criterion to share some common characteristics. They
may view FDI in these countries as riskier investments due to non-
sustainable public debt levels which might have a negative impact
on the expected return on the investment, especially when aggregate de-
mand conditions in the destination market are key to the investment de-
cision. There also seem to be similarities between countries that do not
violate the Maastricht criterion in terms of their potential for attracting
FDI. This implies that a potential withdrawal of FDI from, for example, a
country which violates the Maastricht criterion will likely also lead to
withdrawals of FDI from other Maastricht-violating countries, whereas
countries that do not violate the criterion will not be affected by this
channel of interdependence. Therefore, our research has important
policy implications for governments which try to attract FDI.
AppendixA. Using fuzzymetrics to construct spatial weightmatrices
Following George and Veeramani (1994), Sapena (2001), and
Gregori et al. (2005), we define the fuzzy metric Md as follows:
Md i; jð Þ ¼
M
M þ DIST i; jð Þ ; ð5Þ
where i and j denote two countries,DIST(i, j) is the distance between the
countries and M=max{DIST(i, j) : i, j}. We can then use Md(i, j) as the
entry in a non-row-normalized spatial weight matrix. Clearly, the
weight for two distant countries is smaller than the weight between
two close countries. Note that this is very similar to creating weights
by using the inverse distance as is often done by spatial econometri-
cians. We set the main diagonal of the resulting weight matrix equal
to 0 and row-normalize thematrix, as is standard in spatial econometric
applications. We denote the resulting spatial weight matrix by CFD, FD
for “fuzzy distance”. We can then use this matrix to create the accordingdence of FDI among host countries? The role of geographic proximity
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in the main text, and y denotes the dependent variable.
As ourmeasure of the similarity of public debt levels, we use the fol-
lowing fuzzy metric20:
R i; jð Þ ¼ min DEBTSHARE ið Þ;DEBTSHARE jð Þf g þ 1
max DEBTSHARE ið Þ;DEBTSHARE jð Þf g þ 1 ; ð6Þ
where DEBSTSHARE denotes the level of public debt in terms of a per-
centage of GDP. R(i, j) lies between 0 and 1 and is maximized if both
countries have the same level of public debt. For diverging levels of
debt between the two countries, R(i, j) approaches 0. We can then use
R(i, j) as the entry in a non-row-normalized spatial weight matrix. As
before, we set the main diagonal of the resulting weight matrix equal
to 0 and row-normalize the matrix. We denote the resulting spatial
weight matrix by CR(i, j) and its augmented destination counterpart by
WR(i,j)=In⊗CR(i, j). We use it to construct the pertaining spatial lag for
our regressions, WR(i,j)y.
Finally, we can create another fuzzy metric which combines both
fuzzy metrics introduced above:
Cij ¼ Md i; jð Þ  R i; jð Þ; ð7Þ
where Cij is the product of the two individual fuzzy metricsMd(i, j) and
R(i, j). As before, we set themain diagonal of the resultingweightmatrix
equal to 0 and row-normalize the matrix. We denote the resulting spa-
tial weight matrix by CF and its augmented destination counterpart by
WF= In⊗CF. Its weights increase if either the distance between coun-
tries i and j is small or if they have similar levels of public debt, and de-
crease if the countries are far apart or have different levels of public
debt. We use it to construct the pertaining spatial lag WFy.
Obviously, this metric can be generalized to include more
dimensions.
Appendix B. First-stage regression
Table A.1









0 See Gregori et al. (2005).
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porter FEs YESxporter FEs YES
7022 0.915
L −816.3lnNotes: Results for the first-stage import gravity regression given in Eq. (4) for the 27 Euro-
pean Union countries in 2004. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
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